Social perceptions of Personal Income Tax compliance from a Spanish perspective: estimating the impact of its legal framework by Gutiérrez Díaz, Inmaculada
 Faculty of Social Sciences 
Sociology of Law Department 
 
Social perceptions of Personal Income Tax compliance from a 
Spanish perspective. 
Estimating the impact of its legal framework. 
 
 
 
RÄSM 12 Master Thesis 
Master´s Programme in Sociology of European Law (SELA) 
2014/2015 
Spring semester 2015 
 
 
 
 
Author: Inmaculada Gutiérrez Díaz 
Supervisor: Prof. Måns Svensson 
Examiner: Prof. Håkan Hydén 
 
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Måns Svensson, whose valuable 
comments and expertise made possible this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family, 
Always being an endless source of optimism and support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ATP  Aggressive Tax Planning 
e.g.  For example 
EC  European Commission 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EU  European Union 
FACTA United States´ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
HNWI High Net Worth Individuals 
i.e.  Id est 
IOTA  Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations 
No.  Number  
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PIT  Personal Income Tax 
SSF  Slippery Slope Framework 
VAT  Value Added Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgements  ....................................................................................................... 2 
Abbreviations  ............................................................................................................... 3 
 
Introduction  ................................................................................................................. 5 
   Research question ...................................................................................................... 6 
   Research aim  ............................................................................................................. 6 
1.Research issue  .......................................................................................................... 7 
   1.1.General comments. EU legal framework ............................................................... 7 
   1.2.The measurement of tax compliance  .................................................................. 12 
2.Theoretical framework  .......................................................................................... 14 
   Why does sociology of law help this study?  .............................................................. 14 
   2.1.Fairness .............................................................................................................. 14 
   2.2.Public Opinion  ................................................................................................... 16 
3.Related literature  ................................................................................................... 18 
   3.1.Introduction  ....................................................................................................... 18 
   3.2.Determinants of Personal Income Tax compliance  ............................................. 19 
   3.3.The particular case of Spain  ............................................................................... 25 
4.Empirical results .................................................................................................... 28 
   4.1.Method  .............................................................................................................. 28 
   4.2.Participants  ........................................................................................................ 29 
   4.3.Data  ................................................................................................................... 30 
   4.4.Results and Analysis  .......................................................................................... 42 
5.Final comments ....................................................................................................... 49 
 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 50 
Appendix ..................................................................................................................... 56 
 
 
 
5 
 
Introduction 
This research seeks to find how the Spanish society perceives Personal 
Income Tax compliance. By following the Slippery Slope Framework developed 
by Kirchler (2008), which summarises economic, sociological and psychological 
approaches to tax compliance, the study aims at measuring perceived trust and 
power of Spanish authorities. Higher levels of trust in authorities and power of 
authorities are proportional to raised levels of tax compliance. Estimating 
respondent´s perceptions as to the last legislative reforms introduced for the 
purpose of enhancing compliance, the author explores the efficiency of those 
initiative as well as its positive impact on compliance. Is there an effective breach 
between that implied in the law (fairness of the tax system) and reality (tax 
inequalities) which causes social disruptions? 
Overview 
Increasing mobility of taxpayers (cross-border situations) 
Internationalisation of financial instruments 
Development of technologies and Globalisation 
Reduce TAX COMPLIANCE/Increase TAX MISCONDUCTS/Make difficult for authorities to assess taxes 
properly 
Individuals Governments 
Fiscal consolidation measures have 
increased the overall tax burden across 
the EU 
 
Tax Law reforms have risen PIT rates 
considerably in Spain, 
In 2007, min. rate 24%, max.43% 
In 2014, min. rate 25%, max 52% 
 
 
HOW DO SPANISH PEOPLE PERCEIVE 
COMPLIANCE AND LAW INITIATIVES 
TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT? 
Does Public opinion influence the 
Government performance? 
Different measures to increase tax compliance as tax 
misconducts brought about: 
1.loss of tax revenues (which in times of public debt are even 
more needed) 
2.unfairness and inequalities between individuals. Some 
taxpayers contribute with their fair share while others take 
advantage of available resources to lessen the tax burden 
 
Legislative actions taken both at the EU and national level 
(Spain), 
.Are just a way to increase tax revenues lost? 
.Do they seek to recover the confidence of taxpayers who 
publicly claim for an effective persecution of those who do not 
comply with? 
 
Measures via legislative actions 
COM (2012) 351 final “to reinforce the fight against tax fraud 
and evasion” 
COM (2012) 722 final “to strengthen the fight against tax 
fraud and evasion” 
Directive 2011/16/EU on Administrative cooperation 
Directive 2011/107/EU extending Administrative cooperation 
to financial information 
European Taxpayer´s code 
European Tax Identification number 
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Research question 
“Social perceptions of Personal Income Tax compliance from a Spanish 
perspective. Estimating the impact of its legal framework” 
Research aim 
To find out how Spanish society perceives Personal Income Tax (PIT) 
Compliance. How? Estimating trust in Tax authorities and power of Tax 
authorities as well as measuring the perceived efficiency of tax law and last 
legislative reforms on compliance. Sociology of law will contribute to the 
empirical analysis of economic, psychological and sociological consequences 
defining tax compliance beyond the formalities and due fairness inferred from the 
law. It will be discussed how equitable the tax system is and which are those 
elements causing tax inequalities. 
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1.Research issue 
1.1.General comments. EU legal framework. 
EU citizens are free to move, operate and invest across the European Union, 
however, as personal direct taxation is not harmonised the same rules do not apply 
to every Member State regarding income taxation. Some taxpayers might manage 
to avoid or evade PIT thus not complying with their tax obligations voluntarily. 
Member States still have full sovereignty over the collection of their direct taxes, 
the functioning and consistency of their tax laws and tax administrations as well 
as the fight against tax fraud
1
. Member States have adopted different legal 
instruments looking for an effective cooperation between national tax 
administrations since the increase of cross-border transactions has extended also 
the risks of tax misconducts
2
. This globalised context within the EU has focused 
the attention of administrations on the importance of tax compliance as well as the 
risks of non-compliance, resulting in the adoption of instruments as the Directive 
on exchange of tax information, which shows the joint effort of the EU members 
to efficiently tackle the issue. The European Commission already noted that those 
measures do not mean a tax harmonisation for direct taxation, those are merely 
about enabling Member States to ensure that all taxpayers pay their fair share of 
the tax burden, laying down the same rules, obligations and rights for all 
taxpayers
3
.  
In 2012, in a Communication addressed to the Parliament and the Council to 
reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, the European Commission 
stated the following,  
“Tens billions of euro remain offshore, often unreported and untaxed, reducing 
national tax revenues. Given the order of magnitude, stepping up the fight 
                                                             
1 COM (2012) 351 final, “on concrete ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion 
including in relation to third countries”, at 4 
2
 COM (2012) 351 final, at 6 
3http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/tax_cooperation/mutual_assistance/direct_tax
_directive/index_en.htm Enhanced administrative cooperation in the field of direct taxation 
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against tax fraud and evasion is not only an issue of revenues, but also fairness. 
It is important to remember that the vast majority of EU taxpayers generally seek 
to comply with their tax obligations. Particularly in these difficult economic times, 
these honest taxpayers should not suffer additional tax increases to make up for 
revenue losses incurred due to tax fraudsters and evaders”4 
The communication highlighted that an increase in efficiency and effectiveness of 
tax collection was “desperately needed” also noticing that tax compliance could 
be improved, as well as tax fraud and evasion reduced, through a better use of 
existing legal instruments and the adoption of pending proposals
5
. Direct taxes 
represented the 33.4% of total tax revenues within the EU in 2012, being of 51% 
the revenues obtained from labour
6
, therefore to ensure Personal Income tax 
compliance becomes of special significance for economic stability. 
In a later Communication in 2012 to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax 
evasion, regarding Personal Income taxation in particular, the Commission 
observed as strategy to enhance compliance the improvement of a computerised 
format for automatic exchange of information between Member States on incomes 
from employment, directors´ fees, life insurance products, pensions and 
ownership of and income from immovable property
7
. Advancing the digitalised 
system for the exchange of information, using an EU Tax Identification Number 
(TIN), extending EUROFISC to the field of direct taxation, or creating a 
European Taxpayer´s code are some of the future actions to improve tax 
compliance proposed by the Commission.  
By developing an eventual European taxpayer´s code, which is expected to set out 
best practices for enhancing cooperation, trust and confidence between tax 
administration and taxpayers as well as ensuring transparency on the rights and 
                                                             
4 COM (2012) 351 final, at 3 
5 Ibid 
6
 Cécile Remeur. Tax policy in the EU, Issues and Challenges. EPRS-European Parliamentary 
Research Service, February 2015-PE 549.001, at 9-10 
7 COM (2012) 722 final “an action plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion”; 
Article 8(1) of Council Directive 2011/16/EU 
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obligations of taxpayers, the Commission is seeking to encourage compliance and 
contribute to efficient tax collection
8
. In 2013 the Commission launched a public 
consultation to collect the opinion of stakeholders seeking for concrete 
experiences with national taxpayer´s codes and views on the general and 
procedural principles to be considered for developing the Code. Most Member 
States have established taxpayer´s codes which define the fundamental principles 
applying to tax matters as well as the right and obligations of taxpayers and tax 
administration however the general scope of such codes, the structure or the 
content usually vary from one country to another, which in practice, makes 
extremely difficult for taxpayers to understand and comply with their tax 
obligations especially in the case of cross-border operations
9
. The creation of a 
European code would overcome those difficulties by creating a core of common 
tax principles and taxpayer´s rights and obligations while compiling good 
administrative practices in Member States to ensure transparency, to encourage a 
more service-oriented approach of the administration and to contribute to a more 
effective tax collection
10
.  
During the 18
th
 general assembly of the IOTA (Intra-European Organisation of 
Tax Administrations) held on the summer of 2014, then Commissioner for 
Taxation Algirdas Šemeta pointed out the importance to improve tax compliance 
defining the taxpayer´s code as a blueprint for relations between taxpayers and 
their tax administrations
11. As Šemeta said, in order to safeguard revenues and 
ensure fairness of taxation, the enhancement of voluntary compliance must be a 
major objective of tax administrations thus paving the way for those taxpayers 
                                                             
8
 COM (2012) 722 final, at 10 
9
 Consultation paper –A European Taxpayer´s Code-, TAXUD D.2.002 (2013)276169, at 3 
10 Ibid 
11 “Facilitating tax compliance, tackling non-compliance” Speech/14/526, Algirdas Šemeta, 
Commissioner responsible for Taxation and Customs Union, Statistics, Audit and Anti-fraud. 18th 
General Assembly of the IOTA, Belgrade, 3 July 2014 
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who want to comply voluntarily, as well as a way to “come down hard” on those 
who evade taxes or engage in aggressive tax planning
12
.  
The Commissioner praised the European Taxpayer´s code as a strategy for 
voluntary compliance (coming from the EU level to improve the situation of every 
Member State) which seeks to reduce the risk of mistakes simplifying the tax 
system, especially in cross-border situations, and to encourage compliance 
through a more effective tax collection in every Member State. Šemeta also 
alluded to how studies from different fields as psychology or economy become 
essential to explain the taxpayer´s decisions to voluntarily comply with taxes 
because of the ultimate compliance´s dependence on behaviour. 
1.1.1.Exchange of information 
A set of joint rules, obligations and rights regarding administrative assistance was 
needed to create confidence between Member States, especially in the field of 
direct taxes, as the increasing number of cross-border transactions make more 
difficult to manage national tax systems without receiving information from the 
outside
13
. Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative tax cooperation sought to 
become a proper legal instrument providing for clearer rules on the exchange of 
information between Member States, repealing the former Directive 77/799/EC
14
 
on mutual assistance as this became obsolete and no longer able to meet the new 
requirements for administrative cooperation
15
. Through improving administrative 
cooperation between various Member States the Directive seeks to overcome 
likely misconducts in direct taxation, being compulsory for instance the automatic 
exchange of information between national authorities on incomes arising from 
employment
16
, or the possibility of spontaneous exchange of information if a 
                                                             
12 Speech 14/526. Assembly of the IOTA, Belgrade, 3 July 2014  
13 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of 
taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC  
14
 Council Directive 77/799/EC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the 
competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation 
15 Directive 2011/16/EU 
16
 Art. 8.1 Directive 2011/16/EU 
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taxpayer obtains a tax exemption in one Member State which would cause tax 
liability in a different Member State
17
. 
The importance of automatic exchange of information as a means to combat 
cross-border tax fraud, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning has also been 
recognised at the international level as all Member States have signed bilateral 
automatic exchange agreements to implement the United States' Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), as well as the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has approved a single standard for 
automatic exchange of financial account information
18
. As for ensuring that the 
automatic exchange of information within the Union is in line with prevailing 
international standards, but also aiming at minimising costs and administrative 
burdens both for tax administrations and for economic operators, a new Directive 
expands the scope of administrative cooperation to financial institutions
19
.  
The amending Directive 2014/107/EU extends administrative cooperation to the 
exchange of financial information (including interest, dividends, account balances 
or incomes obtained from the sale of financial assets), for the purpose of enabling 
Member States to correctly enforce their tax laws in those cross-border situations 
where tax evasion is likely to occur, therefore avoiding unnecessary further 
investigations
20
. Categories of reporting financial institutions and reportable 
accounts are designed in this Directive to limit the opportunities for taxpayers to 
avoid being reported by shifting assets to financial Institutions or investing in 
financial products that are outside its scope, thus by 31 July 2015 Member States 
must provide the Commission a list of non-reporting financial institutions and 
excluded accounts
21
. Reporting financial institutions in each Member States are 
required to effectively implement the reporting and due diligence rules in 
consistency with those set out in the Common reporting standards developed by 
                                                             
17 Art. 9.1(b) Directive 2011/16/EU 
18 Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation 
19
 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21
 Directive 2014/107/EU, art.1(2)(e) 
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the OECD, but also from 1 January 2016 Member States must automatically 
exchange information with competent authorities concerning any reportable 
account, as for example personal information of the account holder or the account 
balance or value
22
.  
 
1.2.The measurement of tax compliance 
The measurement of tax compliance raises a number of questions, including the 
methods by which tax authorities measure the level of compliance and identify 
those areas of low compliance, as well as the effectiveness of the methods used in 
practice to improve this
23
. Litigation, enforcement or legislative actions are among 
those activities carried out to enhance compliance by tax administrations around 
the world
24
. These actions must be measured for determining their impact on 
compliance, as well as to define whether or not target outcomes were achieved in 
the end. 
It is reasonable to assume that tax authorities seek to use their resources in an 
optimal way, as part of the process in allocating scarce resources to achieve 
maximum effectiveness, and to collect the tax payable in accordance with the tax 
laws
25
. Once those issues damaging compliance are identified, different strategies 
of legislative, educative, administrative or enforcement nature are developed and 
implemented to address the problem
26
. 
1.2.1.Defining tax compliance 
When measuring compliance, due to the lack of academic consensus in what 
exactly is being measured, the discussion focuses on the importance to know what 
to estimate (i.e., evasion, avoidance, compliance or not compliance), and how 
                                                             
22 Directive 2014/107/EU, art.1(2)(b) 
23 CTPA Centre for Tax Policy and Administration OECD, Compliance Measurement-Practice Note, 
at 3 
24
 Ibid 
25 CTPA OECD, at 5 
26
 CTPA OECD, at 6 
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compliance is defined, that is, whether it is defined according to the tax 
authority´s or the taxpayer´s interpretation of the law and its application to the 
concrete facts
27
. The European Commission defines tax compliance as the degree 
to which a taxpayer complies (or fails to comply) with the tax rules of his country, 
for example by declaring income, filling a tax return, and paying the tax due in a 
timely manner
28
. According to the OECD there are four universal procedural 
obligations for almost all taxpayers regardless of national legislation applicable, 
that is, to register for tax purposes, to file tax returns and pay taxes on time, and to 
correctly report tax liabilities
29
. Voluntary compliance, where taxpayers comply 
with these basic obligations voluntarily, must be distinguished from enforced 
compliance, where taxpayers comply following an intervention of the competent 
authorities
30
. Administrative compliance refers to the procedural obligations 
previously mentioned as administrative rules of lodging and paying on time, or 
reporting requirements
31
. Technical compliance regards, as for instance, if taxes 
are calculated in accordance with the technical requirement of the tax laws or 
taxpayers pay their share of tax in accordance with the provisions of tax laws
32
. 
Measuring technical compliance must begin with determining the correct amount 
of tax payable however the ambiguity in the interpretation and application of tax 
laws make taxpayers and tax administrations to have reasonable but differing 
interpretations of what the tax laws say
33
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
27 CTPA OECD, at 3 
28 COM (2012) 351 final, at 8 
29 OECD Measures of tax compliance outcomes. A practical guide, 24 October 2014 at 60 
30
 Ibid 
31
 CTPA OCDE, at 3 
32 Ibid 
33
 CTPA OECD, at 4 
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2.Theoretical framework 
Why does sociology of law help this study? 
Is there an effective breach between that implied in the law (fairness of the tax 
system) and reality (tax inequalities) which causes social disruptions? Through a 
Sociology of Law approach the study aims at transcending the law´s perspective 
on what is stated in the wording of the formal legal provisions. Regulations on 
personal income taxation ensure tax compliance, that is, fairness and symmetrical 
application of the law to all taxpayers. However non-compliance is an increasing 
phenomenon in the globalised world we live in. Why do tax inequalities arise 
causing manifest social disruptions? This research analyses social perceptions 
(public opinion) as to find out those factors independent of the legal system which 
cause tax misconducts. 
 
2.1.Fairness 
As Hemel noticed, since the start of the financial crisis fairness has become a 
dominant issue in the public debate of taxation focusing the discussion, for 
instance, on how institutions are called upon by the public opinion to protect 
compliant taxpayers from perceived unfair behaviour of other taxpayers
34
.  
Principles of law applied to tax law usually impose obligations on the government 
(i.e. the government must treat all taxpayers equally and must obey the principle 
of legality), however the principle of fairness differs from the rest, as it primarily 
imposes an obligation on taxpayers towards each other
35
. Public debate on 
fairness seems to be dominated by the definition given by legal philosophers, 
which focuses on the relations between taxpayers and the expectations they have 
of each other, that is horizontal fairness or the use that some taxpayers make of 
                                                             
34
 Sigrid J.C.Hemels. Fairness and taxation in a globalized world. Erasmus University Rotterdam 
(EUR)-Eramus School of Law, February 26 2015, at 2 
35
 Hemels (2015), at 8 
15 
 
the tax system resulting in other taxpayers having to pay more
36
. Rawls explains 
fairness from the view of political philosophy, stating that, fairness belongs to a 
political conception of justice to which, society is a fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal persons, “justice as fairness is an intuitive idea implicit in 
the public culture of a democratic society…citizens do not view the social order 
as a fixed natural order, or as an institutional hierarchy justified by religious or 
aristocratic values”37. Citizens are free persons in virtue of their moral powers as 
well as the powers of reason, thought and judgement, but also citizens are equal 
persons based on those powers and the requisite of being fully cooperating 
members of society
38
. Individuals are participant in a fair system of social 
cooperation, where justice is viewed as the capacity to apply, understand and act 
depending on the public conception of justice, and good as those ends which 
individuals may realise for their own sake
39
. Fair social cooperation is agreed by 
those engaged in it, that is, by “free and equal persons as citizens”, appropriate 
conditions must apply to the agreements thus not allowing some persons greater 
advantages than others
40
.  
As Hart observed, “to have a right entails to have a moral justification for limiting 
the freedom of another person, and for determining how should act”41. Following 
this reasoning, by residing in a certain jurisdiction individuals benefit from taxes 
paid by others but, at the same time, those have an obligation to contribute with 
their taxes and not to free ride by tax evasion
42
. Thus, to interference with 
another´s freedom is justified in the case of mutual restrictions because it is fair, 
and this is fair because “only so will be there an equal distribution of restrictions, 
and so, of freedom”43. Taxpayer would only accept a heavier burden if they 
                                                             
36 Hemels (2015), at 2 
37 John Rawls. Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 14, 
No 3 (Summer 1985), pp 223-251, at 231 
38 Rawls (1985), at 233 
39 Ibid 
40 Rawls (1985), at 235 
41
 H.L.A.Hart. Are there any natural rights?.The Philosophical Review, Vol 64, No 2 (April 1955), at 
183 
42 Hemels (2015), at 8 
43
 Hart (1955), at 191 
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perceived that other taxpayers make the same effort, thus the principle of fairness 
forces the intervention of governments to protect compliant taxpayers of those 
free riders who benefit but are not willing to restrict their liberties
44
.   
 
2.2.Public opinion  
Jürgen Habermas observed an early but valuable definition of public opinion in 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere “L´opinion publique was the 
enlightened outcome of common and public reflection on the foundations of 
social order”, with outcomes referred to those scholars from the Enlightenment 
who through books informed the government about its duties and true interests, 
but also about the public opinion which it had to listen and conform
45
. The idea of 
public opinion was already an element in the political arena as its social function 
was to critically scrutinise political matters even though its critical function was 
still viewed as strictly separated from the legislative function
46
. The public sphere 
as a practical element in the political scenario was given the “normative status of 
an organ for the self-articulation of civil society with a state authority 
corresponding to its needs”, through the codification of civil law governments 
developed a system of norms which corresponded civil society´s needs securing 
the private sphere by guaranteeing private property
47
. Legal codification was 
originated in the interest of civil society by means of the public opinion, that is, 
via public scrutiny of private people “through prize competitions and through 
questionnaires public opinion contributed to legal codification even where 
parliamentary bodies did not exist or remained ineffective as in Napoleonic 
France”48.  
                                                             
44 Hemels (2015), at 9 
45 Jürgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991, at 95-96 
46
 Habermas (1991), at 96 
47
 Habermas (1991), at 74-75….“Codifications guaranteed the institution of private property, and 
in connection with it, the basic freedoms of contract, of trade, and of inheritance” 
48
 Habermas (1991), at 76 
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With the help of parliamentary discussion, public opinion makes its desires known 
to the governments, and the government makes its policies known to the public 
opinion, however in a democratic state with a party system only the will of the 
parties that hold the majority are identified with the general will, that is, private 
opinion only becomes “public” when processed through political parties49. Even 
though its attribution to political institutions through a party system does not 
displace the fictive character of public opinion as sovereign for the government, 
empirical social research goes back to establish “public opinion” directly50. A 
concept of public opinion historically meaningful, theoretical clear and 
empirically identifiable can be grounded only in the structural transformation of 
the public sphere itself as well as the significance of its development
51
.  
Opinions may be empirically measured as to their degree of publicness, that is to 
say, a public sphere joining a political scenario where the exercise of social power 
and political domination is effectively subjected to the mandate of democratic 
publicity
52
. Empirical measurement of public opinion becomes the most reliable 
method for obtaining valid and comparable results about the extent of democratic 
integration, also contributing to analyse the evolution of the state and society 
concerned
53
. An opinion that is public, in the strict sense, only generates through 
the mediation of critical publicity
54
. On a sociological perspective such as 
mediation only becomes possible through the participation of private individuals 
in processes of formal communication conducted by intra-organisational public 
spheres (as it would be the case of the abovementioned public consultation 
procedures)
55
.  
Habermas´ approach to public opinion in the Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere fully connects with his theory of communicative action since 
                                                             
49 Habermas (1991), at 239 
50 Habermas (1991), at 239-240 
51 Habermas (1991), at 244 
52
 Ibid 
53
 Ibid 
54 Habermas (1991), at 248 
55
 Ibid 
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through communication public opinion intervenes in the elaboration of the law. A 
legal norm has validity whenever the state guarantees two things, that is, while the 
state ensures average compliance (compelled by sanctions if necessary) and 
assures the institutional preconditions for legitimate legislative procedures
56
. 
Habermas wondered what grounds the legitimacy of laws, becoming this question 
of special significance in modern pluralistic societies in which collectively 
binding ethics disintegrated and morality conscience did not substitute natural law 
(grounded in religion or metaphysics)
57
. The democratic procedure for the 
production of law is the only post-metaphysical source of legitimacy, being this 
democracy legitimised through discourse theory as contributions (like public 
opinions) float freely securing thus democratic opinions and the transparency of 
political will 
58
. The democratic procedure of lawmaking relies on citizens making 
use of their communicative and participatory rights also with an orientation 
toward the common good, which would explain why civil society and political 
public sphere must bear a good portion of the normative expectations especially 
the burden of a normatively expected democratic genesis of law
59
. Discourse 
theory introduces a realistic element since the conditions for a rational political 
opinion and will formation shift from the level of individual or group motivation, 
to the social level of institutionalised processes of deliberation and decision 
making
60
. 
 
3.Related literature 
3.1.Introduction 
The analysis of tax compliance has attracted the attention of academics from 
various fields of study, seeing that in the conduct of the taxpayer effectively 
                                                             
56 Jürgen Habermas, Postscript to Between Facts and Norms. In Mathieu Deflem, Habermas, 
Modernity and Law. SAGE Publications 1996, 1-170, at 136 
57
 Habermas, in Deflem (1996), at 136 
58
 Ibid 
59 Habermas, in Deflem (1996), at 147 
60
 Habermas, in Deflem (1996), at 148 
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intervene concerns pertaining to the law as well as the economy, sociology or 
psychology arena.  
The basic compliance model lays on Allingham and Sandmo (1972) theory of 
Income Tax Evasion, which, based on an economics of criminal approach, 
analysed the taxpayers´ decision on whether and to what extent to avoid taxes by 
deliberate underreporting
61
. Also known as utility theory in this model the 
individuals maximize the utility of tax evasion as the possibility of audit by 
authorities and fixed fines are uncertain. Taxpayers are not motivated per se to pay 
taxes therefore the only way to enforce compliance is through the increase of 
audits and subsequent penalties. Nevertheless scholars have amply criticised this 
model as risk detection as well as punishment might affect the decision to pay 
taxes to some degree, but cannot explain all tax compliance behaviour
62
. As Alm 
pointed out, the puzzle of tax compliance is to comprehend why most people 
continue to pay taxes despite the possibility to avoid, which are those factors or 
reasons underlying compliance. By combining economic and psychological 
determinants the Slippery Slope Framework arises from the field of Economic 
Psychology to explain those puzzling decisions concerning tax compliance from a 
new standpoint, that is, describing the high level of compliance rather than the 
high level of tax evasion
63
. 
 
3.2.Determinants of Personal Income Tax compliance 
Taxpayers´ decision to evade or comply with the tax rules is too complex to be 
explained by a standard economic approach of profit maximization (utility 
theory), therefore, that choice needs to be analysed within a human behaviour 
                                                             
61 Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo. Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of 
Public Economics 1 (1972) 323-338, at 323 
62 James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze. Why do people pay taxes? Journal of 
Public Economics 48 (1992) 21-38. North Holland, at 22 
63
 Gaetano Lisi. The Interaction between trust and power: Effects on tax compliance and 
macroeconomics implications. Journal of Behavioural and Experimental Economics 53 (2014) 24-
33, at 24 
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perspective where psychological determinants as social norms, morality and trust 
intervene
64
. Although this particular study is based on the analysis of trust and 
power as essential elements of the Slippery Slope Framework, most determinants 
of tax compliance will be briefly discussed aiming at offering a thorough analysis 
of research work in the field.   
 
3.2.1.Trust and power, “The Slippery Slope Framework” 
By proposing a framework for tax compliance known as the Slippery slope 
framework (hereinafter SSF), Kirchler summarises economic, sociological and 
psychological determinants of tax compliance to examine trust in tax authorities, 
power of tax authorities and tax payments
65
. The SSF differentiates two forms of 
compliance: voluntary and enforced compliance
66
. Voluntary compliance depends 
on (perceived) trust in tax authorities, whereas enforced compliance relies on the 
effectiveness of tax authorities to clamp down on tax evaders (deterrence 
strategies)
67
.  
The level of tax compliance within a society takes into consideration as two major 
dimensions the existing power of tax authorities and the trust in tax authorities
68
. 
Pursuant to the SSF tax compliance is achieved through increasing levels of 
power and trust being fundamental this interaction for both forms of compliance
69
. 
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Figure 1: Graphical description of the Slippery Slope Framework, Kirchler et al. 2008 
 
If compliance is voluntary high trust in authorities increases cooperation (right 
side of Figure 1), if compliance is enforced the increase of power raises 
cooperation as well (left side of Figure 1)
70
. Tax payments are assumed to be 
influenced by trust and power of authorities: if both trust and power are at 
minimum level, tax payments are assumed to be low; if trust and power of 
authorities increase, tax payments are expected to increase as well
71
. For instance, 
frequent tax audits and strict penalties could diminish the trust of compliance-
minded taxpayers, while no audits could causes doubts and distrust about the 
efficiency of tax´ authorities work
72
. 
The nature of compliance relates to two different tax climates: power of authority 
describes an antagonistic climate between tax authorities and taxpayers causing 
enforced compliance, whereas trust in the authority portrays a synergistic climate 
between tax authorities and taxpayers resulting in voluntary cooperation
73
. By 
trust in authorities, Kirchler refers the general opinion of individuals and social 
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groups that the tax authorities are benevolent and work beneficially for the 
common good
74
. By power of authorities, Kirchler means taxpayers´ perceptions 
of the potential of tax officers to detect illegal tax evasion (e.g. by conducting 
frequent and thorough tax audits), and to punish evasion
75
. The power of 
authorities is largely related to tax legislation and the budget allocated to them by 
a government, but also in some extent to the support given from the population 
(e.g. by being informed about misconduct)
76
. In an antagonistic climate where 
authorities are not trusted power may be effective in increasing compliance, 
however, in a synergistic climate of cooperation power may not provide any 
surplus or even have the opposite than intended effect by reducing trust
77
. Even 
though the SSF confirms the relevance and dynamic relationship of trust and 
power, it offers no elaboration of their possible effects beyond the assumption that 
both elements increase compliance positively
78
.  
Although empirical evidence offers less clarity with regard to power, trust is 
recognised as a strong determinant of cooperation
79
. Kastlunger appeals for a 
theoretical clarification of power (legitimate or coercive power) as well as a deep 
analysis of its effects
80
. As Gangl argued, in order to estimate the prevailing tax 
climate within society, the SSF needs a theoretical formalisation as to explain how 
power and trust may increase or decrease each other, and how this pattern affects 
the relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers
81
. 
The SSF, which serves as guideline for tax research and tax policy, is used as a 
conceptual tool in order to understand the importance of certain factors related to 
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tax behaviour shown in previous researches (i.e. audit probabilities, social norms 
or fairness perceptions), but also as an operational tool to develop strategies of 
adequate interactions between tax authorities and taxpayers
82
. Following this 
reasoning the research seeks to find how society perceives the role of tax 
legislation, that is, whether the extant law as well as new reforms have contributed 
to make PIT compliance possible.  
3.2.2.Norms 
Norms become a relevant factor in tax compliance therefore those behaviours 
determined by the law also play a significant role besides attitude as norms 
encompass both power and trust. Individual norms define internalised standards 
on how to behave being also related to moral reasoning and tax ethics
83
. National 
norms (those become cultural standards often mirrored in the actual law) find their 
expression in tax laws and the role given to tax authorities, having thus a direct 
influence on their power
84
. Social norms such as the belief that tax evasion 
hinders the work of tax authorities might be damaging when there is not 
countervailing norm of community
85
. A norm where all citizens are perceived as 
contributing their fair share would certainly help to increase trust in the 
authorities
86
. Likewise perceived fairness of the tax system relates to the trust 
dimension because equitable treatment of taxpayers (i.e., distributive and 
procedural fairness) helps to build and maintain trust. Retributive justice is 
connected to the power dimension as well, because it depends also on detecting 
and charging offenders
87
. As Wahl suggests governments should try to gain their 
citizens´ trust through emphasizing fair procedures (e.g., citizen´s participation in 
the legislation) or through employing citizen-friendly and service-oriented 
behaviour of tax authorities (e.g., offering help in filling in forms correctly)
88
. In 
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return, the trusting citizens will be voluntarily compliant and abstain from evasion 
when detection is unlikely, whereas they would evade in the case of distrust
89
. 
Therefore, boosting citizens´ trust in authorities would maximize tax payments 
and thus the public revenue
90
. Social norms might influence tax compliance 
however social norms about ethical taxpaying seem to increase only tax 
compliance of taxpayers who identify sufficiently with the group
91
. When 
identification is weak, social norms may have no effect
92
. 
 
3.2.3.Value of public goods 
Individuals pay taxes voluntarily because they value the goods provided by 
government and they recognise that their payment may be necessary to get other 
to contribute
93
. For example, psychologists and other social scientists argue that 
social norms and perceptions of fairness affect compliance, that is, individuals pay 
taxes because they feel that it is a social obligation to do so, although they comply 
less if they perceive that they are treated less fairly than others
94
. Compliance may 
occur because some individuals value the public goods that their tax payments 
finance, therefore an increase in the amount that individuals receive from a given 
tax payment increases their compliance rate
95
. Tax compliance is enhanced when 
individuals view the paying of taxes as a fair fiscal exchange, that is, welfare 
services
96
. 
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3.2.4.Tax morale 
Tax morale, defined as a moral obligation to pay taxes or a belief in contributing 
to society by paying taxes, may also explained the high degree of tax compliance 
as for those cases the level of deterrence is too low
97
 . Trust in the state is 
examined by relating trust in government, parliament and the legal system to tax 
morale
98
. Positive actions by the state are intended to increase positive taxpayer 
attitudes and commitment to the tax system and tax payment, however perceived 
unfairness increases to act against tax laws
99
. From this perspective, taxes are a 
price paid for government actions and maintenance of a fair legal system, thus if 
taxpayers trust state institutions they are more willing to be honest
100
. Both tax 
policies and tax administration reforms concern the level of tax morale, thus, 
changes may have a positive or negative impact on individuals´ satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction
101
. Cummings showed that tax morale enhances tax compliance, 
having therefore quality governance an effective impact, that is, positive 
perceptions of government´s performance might explain why individuals pay 
taxes
102
.  
 
3.3.The particular case of Spain 
Over the last 40 years Spain has experimented radical political and social changes 
initiated for the transition to a democratic system after a large period of military 
dictatorship. During 40 years of dictatorial regime the fiscal system provided 
ample tax evasion opportunities for the wealthy, and there was no political will to 
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prosecute fiscal fraud
103
. Fraud was not considered as a criminal offence, 
defaulters only received small administrative sanctions and the tax collection was 
inefficient due to a poor tax system lacking in personnel and resources
104
. At the 
end of 1970s tax evasion in Spain was estimated at 40% of tax receipts, above 
90% of all Spanish taxpayers recognised the existence of fiscal fraud, and the 
opportunities to commit fraud were of 70% within the upper income level
105
. In 
1977, the Moncloa Pacts set the foundations for the new democratic system. 
Appealing for fiscal reforms and the fight against tax evasion, politicians stated 
their intention to move towards the economic and political model that other 
European Countries reached after the Second World War
106
. Changes became 
especially significant with the accession to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1986, where the harmonisation of the existing tax system with the EEC 
rules was required, having as a milestone the introduction for the first time of the 
Value Added Tax (VAT)
107
.  
As a result of those tax reforms between 1983 and 1987 the Personal Income Tax 
was modernized (with an emphasis on vertical equity and progressivity), the tax 
agency was territorially reorganized (adapting to the new division of powers) and 
its services modernised, also institutional initiatives were taken to increase 
voluntary tax compliance and fight against tax evasion
108
. Martinez-Vazquez and 
Togler argued that the success of profound reforms both in tax policy and the tax 
administration led to a significant increase in tax morale in Spain over the period 
1981-2000
109
. Yet they found that tax morale declined during the second half of 
the 1990s probably as a consequence of institutional changes such as corruption in 
the public sector, high levels of unemployment and the perception of lower levels 
                                                             
103 Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler (2009), at 2 
104 Francisco Comín. Reaching a Political Consensus for Tax Reform in Spain: The Moncloa Pacts, 
Joining the European Union and the Best of the Journey. International Studies Program, Andrew 
Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. Working Paper 06-01, January 2006, 1-
59, at 11 
105 Ibid 
106
 Comín (2006), at 2 
107
 Comín (2006), at 3 
108 Ibid 
109
 Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler (2009), at 20 
27 
 
of tax fairness
110
. While economic growth encourages trust in authorities, high 
insecurity and income inequality penalise trust as probably occurred during the 
1990s.  
During the dictatorship Spain used to be highly centralized however the new 
democratic Constitution of 1978 allowed the creation of the autonomous 
communities with a right of self-governance, moving towards a new regionalized 
state. Spain became a parliamentary monarchy which comprises three-layer 
governance, that is, the central government, the regional (autonomous 
communities) and the local (composed of provinces and municipalities). Navarra 
and the Basque country enjoy a special system of full fiscal autonomy which lets 
them regulate and collect their own taxes (excluding customs tariffs), while the 
rest of regional governments have a fixed scheme of shared tax revenues with the 
central government. 
For calculating Personal Income Tax (PIT) in Spain two different taxable bases 
are used: the general tax base (including among others, incomes obtained from 
employment or immovable assets) and the saving tax base (incorporating incomes 
from interests and dividends, as well as capital gains and losses). It must be 
noticed that two progressive scales are also applied to taxable incomes once 
personal and family allowances are deducted by those entitled. The tax rate 
applied to the taxable basis is the result of adding the state´s scale and the 
Autonomous Community´s scale depending on where the taxpayer resides, being 
each Autonomous Community in charge of approving its own scales of rates. In 
other words, the central government taxes with a progressive scale 50% of all 
personal incomes while the Autonomous Community taxes the remaining 50% 
having normative discretion on rates.   
Alarcón and Ayala analysed the individual perceptions of Spanish citizens 
regarding fiscal ethics and fiscal morale of society (referred in the study as fiscal 
awareness) to evaluate trust in the government. It was found that fiscal awareness 
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is shaped by trust, and thus indirectly, by the socio-economic context as well as 
the citizens´ perceptions on government performance (i.e. welfare enhancement, 
poverty reduction and fairness of the tax system)
111
. Determinants of trust were 
tested with regard to the three levels of governance in Spain. Results have shown 
that Spanish citizens give more attribution to state government regarding social 
policies (reduction of poverty) and fiscal design, while they consider local 
governments are better regarding welfare public services provided to the 
people
112
.  
 
4.Empirical results 
4.1.Method 
This qualitative research aims at identifying perceptions regarding PIT 
compliance in Spain. By conducting semi-structured interviews (using a settled 
questionnaire) empirical data was collected. Hammar noticed as an advantage of 
studying perceived instead of actual tax evasion that respondents were deemed to 
answer more truthfully when they were not asked to reveal their own 
behaviour
113
. Asking about tax compliance perceptions, via adequate questions 
and correct usage of grammar tenses, I expected to obtain a truly insight into this 
sensitive topic. As for researching about the institution of the Ombudsman 
Seneviratne used a textual analysis approach where documentary analysis is 
combined with interviews attempting to obtain more detailed information in 
documents, and to discover social perceptions of the system
114
. Educational 
service agencies were also evaluated in a research using a mixed-method of 
surveys (quantitative) and interviews (qualitative), here semi-structured interviews 
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which included a review of relevant documents (as the primary sources of 
qualitative data) were designed to identify the role of agencies
115
.  In this 
particular case, inspired by the design of public consultations papers launched by 
the European Commission (e.g. the European Taxpayer´s Code), the interview 
was structured as follows, 
a)Introduction-background.  
This includes a review of the existent legal framework both at the EU and national 
level with regard to tax compliance as well as the fight against tax fraud and 
evasion 
b)Part One-Tax compliance 
c)Part Two-Social attitudes towards PIT compliance 
d)Part Three-Fairness 
e)Part Four-Trust and power 
The research is based on the Slippery Slope Framework model developed by 
Kirchler (2008). Trust and power of authorities are estimated to analyse the level 
of tax compliance based on the assumption that high levels of trust and power 
increase compliance. 
 
4.2.Participants 
Ordinary citizens were the population segment chosen as preferred participants for 
this study. By delimiting research participants to ordinary people instead of an 
expert audience, for instance tax officers or civil servants at the Ministry of 
Finance, the study seeks to comprehend how public opinion perceives PIT 
compliance without the risk of idealising the prevailing scenario. 
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Due to the short time available for a 15 credits master´s thesis, research 
participants were restricted eventually to 5 respondents. Semi-structured 
interviews require sufficient time to gather as well as to analyse empirical data in 
a logical way thus for the sake of quality the cluster of respondents was small. 
To select the participants an e-mail was sent out to 15 individuals within a list of 
professional contacts, being the 5 finally chosen those who said yes in the first 
place. In that mail the aim of the research was briefly explained, also remarking 
that they would be part of a master´s thesis project at Lund University. Individual 
interviews, ranging approximately from 1 hour to 1 hour 15 minutes, were held 
in-person on 27
th
, 28
th
 and 29
th
 April 2015. Likewise interviews were recorded 
and subsequently transcribed. For the sake of protecting privacy, respondents 
were labelled as R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5.  
As the interviews were conducted in Spanish all the materials and data collected 
were translated into English. The usage of language within the interviews might 
not be very formal to a certain degree, as the author sought to respect always the 
tone and expressions used by respondents. 
 
4.3.Data 
The data obtained is presented in four different sections following the structure of 
the interview (compliance/ social attitudes towards PIT compliance/ fairness/ 
trust and power). Each section includes an explanation of the objectives pursued 
with the questions at issue as well as relevant justifications found within literature. 
Drawing tables which put together questions and respondents´ answers sought to 
facilitate the reading and comprehension of data.   
4.3.1.Part One-Tax compliance. 
Tax compliance is measured by estimating through the two proposed questions 
whether respondents perceive compliance as enforced or voluntary. The aim that 
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underlies this section is to comprehend according to what individuals pay their 
taxes. 
Question 1.1 (voluntary compliance) 
Question 
1.1 
When people pay their Personal Income Tax (PIT), would you say that 
they do so because they want to contribute to everyone´s good? 
R 1 “To be honest, I do not think there is a common culture in Spain of “paying PIT in 
return of welfare”, though citizens do not pay thinking about everyone´s good” 
R 2 “Some people might pay PIT thinking of everyone´s good and the welfare state, and 
some people might not.  I believe that we cannot demand a welfare state with quality 
services (i.e. education or wealth) if not paying taxes” 
R 3 “Well, I do not think at all that´s the reason for paying PIT” 
R 4 “I think people do not pay PIT because they want to contribute to the common good.  
Actually, in this country, public services are not enough appreciated, some people 
think those should be for granted” 
R 5 “Well, I believe that in Spain, generally, there is NO social conscience regarding the 
welfare state and its economic cost. People do not think about everyone´s good when 
paying taxes, actually, most people do not understand that welfare is financed 
through taxes. In comparison to the USA system, where taxpayers are actively 
involved in public financing, and usually asked “how much that service would cost”, 
deciding finally if that service should be provided or not by the state, here in Spain, 
common taxpayer´s belief is that public services are granted solely by the 
government (do not even thinking that, people maintain welfare through taxes). 
Thus, the common idea here would be “be happy taxpayer, at least, you have social 
protection”” 
 
Question 1.2 (enforced compliance) 
Question 
1.2 
When people pay their PIT according to the law, they do so because 
there might be a possibility to be audited and consequently fined by the 
tax office? 
R 1 “yes, absolutely, otherwise nobody would pay” 
R 2 “Some people might pay taxes just because the risk of detection, and some other 
might not….it´s  something that depends on each individual, we shouldn´t make any 
assumption” 
R 3 “well, yes, watch over taxpayers as well as sanctions contribute effectively to 
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compliance” 
R 4 “Yes, they do. If we have welfare, it´s just because we can maintain it through taxes, 
and people pay just because tax authorities keep an eye on” 
R 5 “Yes, definitely. The thing is that, as explained before, individuals do not intervene 
in deciding how the welfare state should be maintain, which public services or social 
protection should be given by the state. As some other European countries we follow 
a paternalist system, that is, the government decides for us regarding taxation and 
public policies. Ordinary citizens do not take an active part in the tax system, neither 
in public policies, we just pay taxes which finance those services, to which we are 
not attached obviously, and done.  I believe that, this explains the high level of non-
compliance in some European countries. The lack of social compromise in paying 
taxes, taxes that actually we haven´t decided about, make the state´s coercive power 
as the only way for tax compliance” 
 
4.3.2.Part Two-Social attitudes towards PIT compliance.  
In this second part, three questions are addressed to the respondents to measure 
how they think of social attitudes towards tax compliance. Even though the 
comparison between social and legal norms is not aimed at discussing in this 
study, understanding how respondents perceive tax compliance becomes essential 
for grounding the subsequent empirical analysis. 
Question 2.1 
Question 
2.1 
Would you say that taxpayers are influenced by the positive/or negative 
behaviour of other taxpayers when paying their PIT? 
R 1 “Tax non-compliance is something very rooted here in Spain, and not enough 
socially penalised though. When someone does not pay taxes you usually find out 
that his/her family or friends do not do it too” 
R 2 “I would say that tax compliance might be negatively influenced by the tax 
behaviour of certain individuals as politicians, or business people for example. 
Thanks to the media, we´ve known during the last few years that many of those 
people committed tax fraud. The feeling of impunity within society is high, because 
sometimes this negative conduct is not considered a criminal offence, or also 
because criminal liability expires,,, ,though this makes the taxpayer think, why 
should I pay PIT and contribute to everyone´s good if, luckily, I have 1.000EUR 
salary, and those who have high incomes and commit tax fraud are not penalised?”   
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R 3 “No, I don´t think so. The thing is that here in Spain, people who pay less taxes in 
their incomes and are not caught doing it, so to speak, are considered the 
smartest…let´s image an informal talk with friends, if you asked about those people, 
you probably would hear something like “well, they are doing not bad, they were not 
caught at the end”” 
R 4 “Yes, though that the fact that some people do not pay PIT while you are paying, 
probably, might affect taxpayer behaviour”.   
R 5 “Well, in theory, social consciousness here in Andalusia regards tax fraud as a 
negative conduct. However, in practice, as long as you´re not caught evading taxes 
though evasion is not seen as a bad behaviour, at least generally speaking, even 
some people boast about it. Though this is the consequence of a non-quality 
democratic system, the social contract lacks of tax consciousness at all” 
 
Questions 2.2 and 2.3 
Question 
2.2 
Which of the following scenarios would correspond better with the 
acceptance of tax fraud within the Spanish society? 
SCENARIO 1  tax fraud is a type of criminal activity, however socially admitted 
SCENARIO 2  tax fraud is a type of criminal activity, also socially penalised 
SCENARIO 3  tax fraud is not a type of criminal activity 
R 1 SCENARIO 1 
R 2 SCENARIO 2 
R 3 SCENARIO 1 
R 4 SCENARIO 1  
“Yet, although we usually blame high-income individuals or politicians of tax 
evasion and fraud, some middle-class and low income individuals do not pay taxes 
either. Though people should consider as defaulters or criminal, in the same way, all 
non-compliant taxpayers regardless of personal incomes” 
R 5 SCENARIO 1 
Question 
2.3 
Could you give an example of misconduct (regarding PIT compliance) 
which you think it might be socially acceptable? 
R 1 “Well, if I think about self-employed people, they usually find the way to deduct a 
highest amount of expenses in their taxable incomes” 
R 2 “Do not have a legal contract in a company, thus,  the “worker” does not pay any 
income tax because, “officially”,  he/she has no job (shadow economy)” 
R 3 “Working officially as a “part time” employee for an employer, when actually is a 
full-time job, that´s in the top ten” 
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R 4 “Taking into account the financial crisis we have lived, society does not consider a 
bad behaviour those self-employed workers, like plumbers or mechanics for 
example, who do not declare any personal income” 
R 5 “Well, to declare less personal incomes, in that case a lower tax rate applies to the 
taxable base. You know, for example, people do not want to pay for broadcasters 
that service has to be for free, but who pays that in the end? People prefer to find the 
way to reduce tax rates on incomes, instead of paying for that” 
 
4.3.3.Part Three-Fairness.  
Through this part of the interview perceived fairness of the Spanish tax system is 
assessed.  
Questions 3.1 and 3.2 estimate procedural fairness, that is to say, respondents´ 
perceptions of the trustworthiness of Spanish tax agency and its work measuring 
also whether the agency has a polite and competent treatment towards 
taxpayers
116
. Questions are based on some of the factors found as encouraging or 
discouraging tax compliance by Sigala in a study regarding Tax Communication 
in Britain, as for example the need for correct information or the fear of making 
any unintentional mistake
117
. Also some of the assumptions proposed by Cullis to 
measure tax evasion were used to design questions 3.1 and 3.2, for instance, 
existent difficulties on taxing procedures which might reduce compliance
118
. 
Question 3.1 
Question 
3.1 
Would you say that the tax authorities offer correct information and 
technical support to fill your tax return? Would you say that is difficult 
to fill your tax return? 
R 1 “Even though the computerised system makes easier to fill the tax return, I think, in 
general, people do not have enough tax information” 
R 2 “Yes, in that particular case, I believe the tax authorities provide the necessary 
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technical support. Tax offices offer taxpayers a service of individual appointments, 
in case that they need assistance to fill the tax return. That service is for free, thus, 
everybody can have professional support regardless of economic means” 
R 3 “If there are special circumstances, like for example, the taxpayer has two different 
employers, or capital gains or losses, then it´s not as easy to fill the tax return. The 
problem is that, individual appointments at the tax office are only scheduled in the 
mornings, what about if you cannot leave work during mornings? Even though tax 
authorities´ support is good, they should improve this service” 
R 4 “There is not enough information available, though tax offices don´t provide 
satisfactory assistance to the taxpayers” 
R 5 “Though, in general, the information and technical support offered to the taxpayer is 
good. Phone assistance, individual appointments at office, or prefilled tax returns, all 
those services are for free, and allow the taxpayer to fill the tax return if cannot pay 
for financial advisory services” 
 
Question 3.2 
Question 
3.2 
Have you ever feared of being fined in case of making an unintentional 
mistake in your tax return? 
R 1 “No, because of my low incomes, the tax-free personal allowance always applies 
for me. I do not have to submit the tax return, so I have no fear” 
R 2 “Yes, I have. Although you have the knowledge to fill the tax return correctly, you 
might make mistakes. I feel the fear is higher when you fill the tax returns on behalf 
of other taxpayer, as tax agent for example” 
R 3 “No, I have not. The tax office usually send you a pre-filled tax return, well, 
actually you have to download the prefilled tax return with a personal code they 
give you. It´s quite easy, you only have to confirm the data” 
R 4 “No, I trust on the pre-filled tax return” 
R 5 “No, I have not. If I have any doubts I usually call the tax office. If I still feel unsure 
about any deduction on expenses, which though it might be the most troublesome in 
practice, I just do not include it in the tax return” 
 
Questions 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 measure distributive fairness, in short, how respondents 
perceived the outcomes of their contribution to the system through paying PIT 
(costs), but also benefits obtained in return. On the group level, as Kirchler stated, 
taxpayers demand a fair treatment of their group in comparison to other groups, if 
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perceived its tax burden as heavier. On the societal level, taxpayers are concerned 
about the fairness of the outcomes for the whole nation
119
. Likewise one of these 
questions has been especially addressed to estimate perceived fairness regarding 
High net worth individuals (HNWI), as those in the top of the income scale are 
generally seen as favoured by the tax system. These individuals might have 
greater opportunities for Aggressive Tax Planning (ATP) as incomes usually 
come from a wide range of sources located presumably in different spots, besides 
those are more likely to receive advice from a financial expert. Governments 
around the world are concerned with how they must treat HNWI as to make 
fairness visible to ordinary citizens, at the same time that they do not lose those 
high-income taxpayers because of heavy taxation.   
Question 3.3 
Question 
3.3 
Would you say that you receive enough in return in comparison to the 
amount of PIT you pay? 
R 1 “I believe tax payments usually are not proportional to the amount of incomes. Tax 
burden is very high for low-income taxpayers, while public services are getting 
worse” 
R 2 “Though I have paid much more taxes on my incomes than services I have received 
in return. Welfare system would be way better if we all contributed to its 
maintenance, but at the end, we all care about our pockets…effective prosecution of 
defaulters, that´s the only solution” 
R 3 “I would say yes, the system is fair. I haven´t paid taxes on my incomes yet, as those 
are very low, but still I have received social protection” 
R 4 “Not at all, public expending in welfare has been dramatically reduced over the last 
few years, we pay much more than we receive” 
R 5 “No, the tax system is asymmetrical, I mean, taxes are not paid in proportion. High-
income taxpayers do not pay enough on their incomes, for sure. Low-incomes do not 
contribute, and middle-class population, which traditionally supported the highest 
tax burden, has reduced during the last few years. What that means in practice? less 
PIT revenues, less quality services”   
  
 
                                                             
119 Kirchler et al. (2008), at 219 
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Questions 3.4 and 3.5 
Question 
3.4 
Do you think is possible to pay less income tax depending on your 
employment status? How do you think other people might do it? 
R 1 “No. though, in practice, it´s difficult to lessen your taxes depending on your 
employment status” 
R 2 “Yes. If you are a self-employed or a contractor, for example, you can deduct more 
expenses which may reduce your taxable income, or just not declaring the total of 
your personal incomes. If you are an employee, that´s pretty difficult, since there is a 
withholding tax paid by the employer. But, as for my professional experience, in 
practice everything is possible” 
R 3 “Yes, sure, if you´re a self-employed you obviously decide the amount of personal 
incomes to declare” 
R 4 “Well, sorry, I have no idea how that works, I´m doctoral student on chemistry not 
in laws” 
R 5 “Well, for employees or civil servants, it´s too difficult to reduce taxable incomes, or 
asking for deductible expenses. Though withholding taxes help to reduce non-
compliance or fraud” 
Question 
3.5 
Would you say that HNWI pay enough taxes on their incomes? If the 
government would increase the tax burden to this segment of population 
in order to collect more taxes, would this influence on HNWI´s decision 
of leaving the country seeking a more beneficial tax treatment? 
R 1 “Though the first step would be to enhance a social consciousness about welfare, in 
my view, the sense of community/and cooperation does not exist within the Spanish 
society. I believe that, there is not enough “political commitment” to retain high-
income taxpayers here” 
R 2 “Taking into account the regressive nature of our tax system, in theory, yes, high-
income individuals should be the ones who contribute in a greater extent to public 
financing, instead of middle-class taxpayers. Yet, in practice, aggressive tax 
planning makes possible the exit of incomes to more beneficial spots somewhere 
else” 
R 3 “Well, obviously, to increase the tax burden of HNWI might mean offshoring 
activities in practice. But, at the same time, what about tax inspectors´ duties? 
Controlling compliance, that´s their job” 
R 4 “Though it wouldn´t be bad to increase the tax burden of HNWI, even though some 
of those would leave to offshore territories, for example….but still, though many 
companies and HNWI would stay here in Spain, for tax purposes, I mean. 
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4.3.4.Part Four-Trust and power.  
This part aims at estimating perceived trust in the Spanish government as well the 
effective power of authorities. 
Question 4.1 was designed using the model proposed in a recent experimental 
survey which explores tax compliance among Greeks. In order to avoid 
preconceived perceptions this study creates a fictitious country to which are 
assigned four possible scenarios identifying the existent level of trust and 
power
120
. As for preventing a likely political debate which is out of the scope of 
the research, in this particular case four settled scenarios are presented to the 
respondents to determine the perceived degree of trust and power. Scenario 1 and 
scenario 2 correspond to a high degree of trust and power, while scenario 3 and 4 
conforms to the case of low trust and power of government and authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
120 Georgia Kaplanoglou & Vassilis T.Rapanos. Why do people evade taxes? New experimental 
evidence from Greece. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 56 (2015) 21-32, at 23 
Advantageous tax treatment of high-income individual only contribute to make 
worse social stability” 
R 5 “Well, the thing is the lack of political commitment to combat aggressive tax 
planning, That´s happening, basically, thanks to the weakness/and loopholes of tax 
laws. Though it´s pretty easy for HNWI individuals, due to their political 
connections and financial capability, for instance, to change their residency to off-
shore territories, or to have tailored financial advisory. I believe this segment of 
population doesn´t really feel they must contribute to the system, because their high-
incomes actually allow them to pay private services as health or education. So, why 
pay more when you could pay less?” 
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Question 4.1 
Question 
4.1 
In your opinion, which of the following proposed scenarios fix better to 
Spain right now? Could you explain why so? 
SCENARIO 1  The government is highly trustworthy and service oriented. 
Politicians do not misappropriate revenues obtained from PIT collection. The use of 
that money is transparent and invested in welfare. There is a little corruption and 
people trust local/regional/and local governments. Government also acts on interest 
of the Community and common good rather than the interest of a few ones. 
SCENARIO 2  Tax authorities work efficiently and implement Income tax law. A 
high budget is allocated to the tax office, thus, authorities have enough resources to 
effectively detect and prosecute tax evasion.  
SCENARIO 3  The government is highly untrustworthy and not service oriented. 
There is an opaque legal system, which also lacks of transparency in the use of 
revenues obtained from PIT collection.  
SCENARIO 4  Tax authorities have a low budget and resources available, thus, 
income tax law is not efficiently implemented in practice.  Authorities are lenient 
regarding tax evaders. Taxpayers know that the chanced to be audited are low. 
 
R 1 SCENARIO 3 
“This scenario might be the one which better adjusts to Spain´s political and social 
context right now. Corruption affects to the whole society, that´s the big issue” 
 
R 2 “Any of the proposed scenarios adjust to the reality. As a legal professional, I would 
say that, tax authorities enhance tax compliance and prosecute tax fraud, actually, 
I´ve personally experienced a few times how they carry out audit processes. 
Prosecution and tax inspections should be more effective? Yes, absolutely. But then, 
tax offices should have enough financial resources (government expenditure), and 
staff as well (civil servant competitions have been stopped for a few years, thus, staff 
has not been replaced). Also, judges have to deal with tax fraud procedures without 
having sufficient resources. The feeling of impunity regarding some taxpayers´ 
misconducts, that´s what makes society distrust the government” 
R 3 SCENARIO 3 
“Reasons? Well, first, transparency. Where PIT revenues go? Because, I see that 
public expenditure has been cut since 2009, for example, funding allocated to 
prescriptions. Now, prescriptions charges apply for some drugs or medical 
treatments. Second, some politicians, business people, and even members of the 
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monarchy, prosecuted for tax fraud” 
 
R 4 SCENARIO 3 
“We all know thanks to the media that, many politicians, even trade union 
representatives, had been involved in tax fraud. Though public revenues have been 
misused, sometimes even for private purposes, who would trust them in these 
circumstances?”  
 
R 5  SCENARIO 3 
“Actually, I have not much to add”  
 
Questions 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 seek to estimate how respondents see the existent legal 
framework regarding tax compliance as well as the fight against tax fraud and 
evasion (as non-compliant behaviours). All legislative measures taken in this 
field, at the EU and national level, are briefly described at the beginning of the 
interview (in the background section). Likewise before raising these three 
questions to the respondents, some of the legal initiatives adopted at the Spanish 
level are mentioned as a reminder, for example,  
.tax amnesty in 2012 
.or, the duty of compulsory information concerning the ownership of any 
immovable property out the territory of the country (RD 1558/2012 of 15 
November 2012 implementing the Enhanced Cooperation Directive) 
 
Question 4.2  
Question 
4.2 
Independently of your own political ideas, do you think the last reform 
of the Income tax law as well as the rest of legislative reforms over the 
last few years have effectively contributed to fight against tax fraud? 
R 1  “No, I don´t believe legislative reforms have reduce tax fraud, even less in the case 
of high-income individuals”   
R 2 “Well, at least, measures have been taken, which is positive indeed. But, obviously, 
those haven’t been very effective in practice we see the consequences every day on 
news. Though it´s pointless to reform the law, and to create new obligations and 
penalties, if the tax authorities still do not have enough resources implement 
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legislation effectively” 
R 3 “No, that´s clear, you just have to read the newspapers” 
R 4 “No. If you think about the amnesty, well, defaulters legalised money and paid only 
10% charge, where is the penalty there? Though this didn´t help to reduce tax 
evasion in a future” 
R 5 “To some extent, yes. However, a more effective and egalitarian Income Tax law 
seeking redistribution (also in practice, not only in theory), would contribute more 
positively to higher levels of compliance. Middle-class individuals shouldn´t bear 
the highest tax burden” 
 
Question 4.3 
Question 
4.3 
Would you say that all those reforms enhancing tax cooperation and 
fighting against tax fraud might be an answer to public pressure? 
R 1 “Yes. Even though I believe the measures adopted are ineffective, those are the 
result of public pressure and social unrest” 
R 2 “Yes, if politicians took the initiative to change the law, though it´s just because the 
existing political discontent and social mobilization. Although tax laws in particular 
are sensitive to become a political instrument, which do not make them more 
effective in practice, in this case public pressure is being positive” 
R 3 “Yes, they (politicians) had to do something, people just didn´t put up with that 
unbearable situation any longer, tax fraud/evasion was all over the place….” 
R 4 “Yes, reforms are the consequence of public pressure, I would say that the only 
reason for changes indeed. Yet, though those reforms are not fighting effectively 
against tax fraud or tax evasion, tax laws remain being more favourable to the 
richest” 
R 5 “Well, I wouldn´t say that public pressure was the reason to the changes in the law. I 
believe that authorities have tried to show citizens how effectively they are fighting 
against taxpayers´ misconducts, for example, publishing the amount of revenues 
obtained thanks to the prosecution of evasion. Yet, I believe that legislative reforms 
are just becoming a political instrument. Spanish society has been claiming for 
political and social reforms during the last few years, that´s pretty clear, being the 
unfairness of the tax system one of the complaints.  The government had to deal with 
that situation somehow, meaning, introducing some changes in the law. But still, 
legislative reforms have not reduced the tax burden for middle-class taxpayers” 
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Question 4.4 
Question 
4.4 
Would you say that there are mutual cooperation/ joint efforts between 
tax authorities to fight against non-compliance? 
R 1 “Well, I had no idea about that mutual cooperation between tax authorities, hadn´t 
heard about that. Anyway, I still think that tax authorities should prosecute more 
effectively defaulters” 
R 2 “Yes, I believe that tax authorities are working together and cooperating in the fight 
against tax misconducts. Yet, the only reason for that is the lack of revenues, and the 
high public debt. That is, authorities need more revenues because the public 
spending is not balanced, the way is to recover that money uncollected as a result of 
tax evasion or fraud” 
R 3 “No, at the Spanish level, you see that there is not mutual cooperation between 
authorities, even less regarding the proper functioning of the tax system” 
R 4 “No, I don´t think so. Here, you perfectly see that depending on the party leading a 
particular region or municipality, if that´s the same or not as the one in the central 
government, there is cooperation and communication, or there is not. That happens 
in education, social security, and so on….thus, same occurs with tax cooperation”   
R 5 “No, I´d say that there is no mutual cooperation between the different tax 
administrations, not at the national or EU level. What´s more, here in Spain, there is 
no mutual cooperation between the ministry of finance and other bodies as the 
judiciary, or the ministry for home affairs, for example. If that mutual cooperation 
exists, at least people do not see the results in practice” 
  
 
4.4.Results and analysis 
4.4.1.Results 
Participants observed that taxpayers do not think of contributing to the common 
good when paying PIT. Most of participants agree on enforced compliance, 
through a controlling and punishing system, as the reason for paying PIT. They 
also share that public services are not enough appreciated by the citizens, who do 
not really know about the cost related to quality services, “there is NO social 
conscience regarding welfare state and its economic cost” (R 5, question 1.1) 
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Non-compliance is regarded as a misconduct not enough penalised within Spanish 
society “…even some people boast about it” (R 5, question 2.1) denoting to some 
extent the risk of being caught evading taxes as a decisive factor of compliance. 
One of the respondents refers to the feeling of impunity as determinant for not 
complying with PIT “….because sometimes this negative conduct is not 
considered a criminal offence, or also because criminal liability expires” (R 2, 
question 2.1), also highlighting how tax misconducts of high-income individuals 
influence negatively the conduct of the regular taxpayer. Just one of the five 
participants regards tax fraud as a socially penalised offence. The rest see tax 
fraud as a criminal activity which is generally socially approved within Spanish 
society. However all respondents are aware that tax fraud is a criminal offence 
punished by law.  
One of the respondents also noticed that all taxpayers should be considered 
defaulters in the same way regardless of personal incomes “…although we usually 
blame high-income individuals or politicians of tax evasion and fraud, some 
middle-class and low income individuals do not pay taxes either” (R 4, question 
2.2). As likely misconducts regarding PIT compliance respondents refer to self-
employed people as those who might benefit of highest deductions on expenses, 
or might declare less incomes to lessen the tax burden. Also the discussion brings 
up informal economy as an activity outside government regulation which is used 
to elude taxation on incomes. Actually, informal economy has been a core factor 
within public debate regarding economy and finances over the last few years. I do 
think respondent 3´s observation in question 2.3 reveals the magnitude of the 
problem “working officially as a “part time” employee for an employer, when 
actually is a full-time job, that´s in the top ten”.    
Regarding fairness respondents seem to value as service-oriented the activity of 
tax authorities as well as the support provided for PIT collection. Despite the fear 
of unintentional mistakes, in general, participants trust on the pre-filled tax return 
system and tax information services. As for the amount of PIT paid and outcomes 
received in return (welfare services, quality of those services), almost all 
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respondents consider the system not enough fair as they have paid much more 
than received, “I have paid much more taxes on my incomes than services I have 
received in return”(R 2, question 3.3), “we pay much more than we receive” (R 
4, question 3.3). One of the respondents argues that the reduction of middle-class 
population, who traditionally bears the highest tax burden of PIT, has contributed 
to diminish quality services“…middle-class population, which traditionally 
supported the highest tax burden, has reduced during the last few years. What 
that means in practice? less PIT revenues, less quality services” (R 5, question 
3.3). When asking about the possibility of reducing PIT contributions respondents 
reaffirm that self-employed are more likely to lessen their tax burden. However 
the system of withholding tax applied on labour incomes reduces the risk of non-
compliance for civil servants or employees. Participants fully agree that high-
income taxpayers usually receive a more favourable tax treatment even 
questioning authorities´ will to efficient persecute those individuals, low fairness 
seems to be a shared perception with regard to HNWI taxpayers  “there is not 
enough “political commitment” to retain high-income taxpayers here” (R 1, 
question 3.5),  “taking into account the regressive nature of our tax system, in 
theory, yes, high-income individuals should be the ones who contribute in a 
greater extent to public financing” (R 2, question 3.5), “advantageous tax 
treatment of high-income individual only contribute to make worse social 
stability”(R 4, question 3.5).  
Except for one respondent who did not identify any of the proposed scenarios 
with his/her perception of current Spanish society, the rest of respondents chose 
SCENARIO 3 “the government is highly untrustworthy and not service oriented. 
There is an opaque legal system, which also lacks of transparency in the use of 
revenues obtained from PIT collection”. These results show that citizens do not 
perceive reliability or credibility of Government. However no mention is made to 
the trust on tax authorities. Most respondents do not consider that legislative 
actions taken by the Government in order to improve compliance and reduce tax 
misconducts are effective in practice. Likewise most of them make reference to 
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the media as to prove failed legal measures “…those haven’t been very effective in 
practice, we see the consequences every day on news” (R 2, question 4.2), “…no, 
that´s clear, you only have to read the newspapers”(R 3, question 4.2).   
Public pressure is viewed as the trigger for changing tax laws and enforcing tax 
compliance (solely one respondent did not see public pressure as the reason for 
changes in the law). Nevertheless, respondents also noticed that tax laws may 
become a political instrument “…tax law in particular are sensitive to become a 
political instrument” (R 2, question 4.3), “…I believe that legislative reforms are 
just becoming a political instrument. Spanish society has been claiming for 
political and social reforms during the last few years, that´s pretty clear, being 
the unfairness of the tax system one of the complaints” (R 5,  question 4.3). Only 
one participant considers that tax authorities are cooperating to enhance 
compliance and fight against non-compliance, however, the only reason for that is 
“the lack of revenues, and the high public debt” (R 2, question 4.4). The rest of 
participants do not perceive mutual or joint cooperation between authorities as to 
ensure compliance and fight against defaulters, “no, I don´t think so….you 
perfectly see that depending on the party leading a particular region or 
municipality, if that´s the same or not as the one in the central government, there 
is cooperation and communication, or there is not”(R 4, question 4.4), “no, I´d 
say that there is no mutual cooperation between the different tax administrations, 
not at the national or EU level” (R 5, question 4.4) 
4.4.2.Analysis 
The research found that respondents did not perceive high levels of trust and 
power. Due to the lack of power as well as non-credibility participants regard 
authorities´ performance as negative to voluntary tax compliance. However 
participants seem to differentiate Government (local, regional or state level) from 
tax offices when speaking about authorities. The performance of the tax agency is 
not perceived as unreliable even though they consider available resources not 
sufficient. Likewise that deficiency of resources (personnel/budgetary) is regarded 
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as solely attributable to the Government. The level of fairness within society is 
perceived as low.  
Respondents also viewed that high-incomes individuals do not pay enough PIT in 
comparison to middle-class taxpayers. In general, that “advantageous” tax 
treatment is seen as detrimental to Spanish society since the quality of public 
services is reduced as well as social stability damaged. The OECD has observed 
in many countries the wide perception amongst population that high-income 
individuals pay less PIT proving therefore the public scrutiny and vigilance 
towards this segment of population
121
. HNWI usually attract media and public 
attention more than other individuals because of their high standing in industry 
and business or their celebrity status, thus, in case of tax offences those are also 
likely to draw more interest
122
. Nevertheless the OECD called Governments for 
demonstrating that their tax systems are fair and compliance strategies equally 
apply to all taxpayers, encouraging as well for a good understanding of the HNWI 
segment (early identification of key issues and trends prevent from tax 
misconducts)
123
. Still respondents see a clear lack of political commitment to 
combat non-compliance. Law reforms do not address taxpayers´ demands as 
participants have not perceived significant changes regarding compliance. 
Besides, reforms are considered useless since the Government does not provide 
resources to implement them in practice.  
Interviews include in the background section a brief review of legal measures 
taken at the EU level (as explained in part 1 of the study), also mentioning 
reforms at the national level. While the awareness of Spanish law was average in 
general, the study showed that respondents were not fully aware of EU legislation 
at issue, in some cases not aware at all “Well, I have no idea about that mutual 
cooperation between tax authorities, haven´t heard about that” (R 1, question 
4.4).  
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122 OECD 2009, at 14 
123
 OECD 2009, at 13-14 
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This would demonstrate the difficulty to comprehend taxation due to its inherent 
complexity but also that respondents know very little about EU legislative actions.  
The regularisation process carried out in 2012 was considered as the most trivial 
measure since penalties of 10% charge over the value of undeclared assets or 
money were not regarded sufficient. Respondents see the amnesty a way to collect 
revenues rather than a measure to reinforce tax compliance. Over the last 40 
years, as it is explained in part 3 of the research, the Spanish tax system 
experienced profound changes. Previous tax reforms, as the one during the period 
1989-1990, were also complemented by way of a tax amnesty. In 1991 an 
amnesty was implemented to disclosure undeclared incomes, however, it has been 
already questioned by literature if that regularisation process benefited positively 
tax compliance, or just sought to recover revenues
124
.  
Sociology of law becomes of special relevance for this particular study in so far 
tax fairness is regarded as an overriding concern in the public debate, especially, 
since the beginning of the financial crisis. Tax compliance entails fairness 
whereas non-compliance results in inequity. Fair taxation does not impose 
obligations solely to the Government as ultimate guarantor of legality. Taxpayers 
must cooperate equally to build a fair tax system. A system where all taxpayers 
are treated symmetrically (that is, where taxpayers contribute in the same manner 
to the welfare maintenance) enables to build trust. Fairness, trust and power 
become essential elements for the analysis of tax compliance.  
According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 (source International 
Transparency), 67% of respondents in Spain viewed that parliament/legislature 
was corrupt/extremely corrupt, while public officials and civil servants were 
regarded the same by 42%
125
. The Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 (source 
International Transparency), which estimates the perceived level of public sector 
corruption, ranked Spain no. 37 in a list of 175 countries and territories quite far 
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from other EU countries as Denmark (no. 1), Sweden (no.4) or France (no.26)
126
. 
Corruption may undermine justice and economic development but also destroys 
trust in governments and leaders
127
. Still 45% of Spanish respondents agreed that 
ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption
128
.   
Sociology of law deals with the relationship between law and society analysing 
empirically economic, psychological and sociological consequences which may 
determine the law formal discourse
129
.  Examining PIT compliance beyond the 
formalities and fairness inferred from the tax law this particular research sought to 
find how “equitable” individuals perceive the tax system as well as to identify 
those elements causing inequalities. If 45% of people viewed that changes are still 
possible (via public pressure for instance), this study may offer valuable data to 
estimate citizens´ trust in tax authorities and also power of authorities to tackle 
non-compliant behaviours. By applying the Slippery Slope Framework the 
research finds out those positive or negative factors determining tax compliance, 
enabling as well the creation of corrective strategies between authorities and 
clients.  
Public opinion appears as a source of valuable data for legislature. People might 
not have a thorough knowledge of tax law however they certainly experience its 
effects creating their own opinion. Public opinion also takes part in the lawmaking 
process as Habermas observed. Therefore measuring citizens´ perceptions of tax 
compliance allow us to ascertain if effective communication between civil society 
and the legislature exists, that is, whether the tax law has been the result of a 
democratic process.  Through estimating perceptions of PIT compliance the study 
seeks to analyse people´s perception of the law rather than its content.  
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5.Final comments 
Further researches are needed to validate the results shown in this paper. Even 
though determinants of PIT compliance are estimated and discussed in detail 
additional data covering a larger population (e.g. by performing a quantitative 
survey) would help to confirm the research findings. This study could be the 
preliminary part of a more ambitious project where other aspects of PIT 
compliance were examined as the importance of social and individual norms for 
tax ethics, or those strategies to enhance the relationship between taxpayers and 
tax authorities. While searching for material I realised that general perceptions 
regarding tax compliance in the case of Spain usually are negative (same happens 
with other Southern European countries as Italy, Greece or Portugal). 
International media, for instance, has focused its attention on some flagrant cases 
of tax evasion occurred in Spain during the last few years. To the contrary, tax 
compliance is seen as something positive in the case of Sweden, Denmark or 
Norway
130
. Broadening the scope of this study to a cross-country analysis would 
let a comparison of PIT compliance in Spain and other EU countries with highest 
levels of tax compliance, as Sweden for example, aiming at offering valuable 
solutions and learning from a successful experience. To conduct new researches 
on tax compliance within the field of Sociology of Law could offer appealing 
solutions with the ultimate purpose of reducing negative effects of government 
activity as well as to enable welfare of societies at issue. 
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APPENDIX 
-Semi-structured interview- 
(Questions) 
 
Q1.1. When people pay their Personal Income Tax (PIT), would you say that they 
do so because they want to contribute to everyone´s good? 
Q1.2. When people pay their PIT according to the law, they do so because there 
might be a possibility to be audited and consequently fined by the tax office? 
Q2.1. Would you say that taxpayers are influenced by the positive/or negative 
behaviour of other taxpayers when paying their PIT? 
Q2.2. Which of the following scenarios would correspond better with the 
acceptance of tax fraud within the Spanish society? 
SCENARIO 1 tax fraud is a type of criminal activity, however socially admitted 
SCENARIO 2 tax fraud is a type of criminal activity, also socially penalised 
SCENARIO 3 tax fraud is not a type of criminal activity 
Q2.3. Could you give an example of misconduct (regarding PIT compliance) 
which you think it might be socially acceptable? 
Q3.1. Would you say that the tax authorities offer correct information and 
technical support to fill your tax return? Would you say that is difficult to fill your 
tax return? 
Q3.2. Have you ever feared of being fined in case of making an unintentional 
mistake in your tax return? 
Q3.3. Would you say that you receive enough in return in comparison to the 
amount of PIT you pay? 
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Q3.4. Do you think is possible to pay less income tax depending on your 
employment status? How do you think other people might do it? 
Q3.5. Would you say that HNWI pay enough taxes on their incomes? If the 
Government would increase the tax burden to this segment of population in order 
to collect more taxes, would this influence on HNWI´s decision of leaving the 
country seeking a more beneficial tax treatment? 
Q4.1. In your opinion, which of the following proposed scenarios fix better to 
Spain right now? Could you explain why so? 
SCENARIO 1 The government is highly trustworthy and service oriented. Politicians do not 
misappropriate revenues obtained from PIT collection. The use of that money is transparent and 
invested in welfare. There is a little corruption and people trust local/regional/and local 
governments. Government also acts on interest of the Community and common good rather than 
the interest of a few ones. 
SCENARIO 2 Tax authorities work efficiently and implement Income tax law. A high budget is 
allocated to the tax office, thus, authorities have enough resources to effectively detect and 
prosecute tax evasion.  
SCENARIO 3 The government is highly untrustworthy and not service oriented. There is an 
opaque legal system, which also lacks of transparency in the use of revenues obtained from PIT 
collection.  
SCENARIO 4 Tax authorities have a low budget and resources available, thus, income tax law is 
not efficiently implemented in practice.  Authorities are lenient regarding tax evaders. Taxpayers 
know that the chanced to be audited are low 
Q4.2. Independently of your own political ideas, do you think the last reform of 
the Income tax law as well as the rest of legislative reforms over the last few years 
have effectively contributed to fight against tax fraud? 
Q4.3. Would you say that all those reforms enhancing tax cooperation and 
fighting against tax fraud might be an answer to public pressure? 
Q4.4. Would you say that there are mutual cooperation/joint efforts between 
authorities to fight against non-compliance behaviours? 
